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Abstract: The literature in economic methodology has witnessed an 
increase in the number of studies which, drawing upon the postmodern 
turn in social sciences, pay serious attention to the non-epistemological-
discursive elements of economic theorizing. This recent work on the 
“economic discourse” has thus added a new dimension to economic 
methodology by analyzing various discursive aspects of the 
construction of scientific meanings in economics. Taking a similar 
stance, this paper explores Michel Foucault’s archaeological analysis of 
scientific discourses. It aims to show that his archaeological reading     
of the history of economic thought provides an articulate non-
epistemological framework for the analysis of the discursive elements in 
the history of economics and contemporary economic theorizing. 
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There seems to be a growing number of economists today who, against 
the dominance of the mainstream paradigm, make the case for 
pluralism in economics and show an awareness of different theoretical 
approaches in the discipline. This awareness, in the form of a 
philosophical self-reflection, has led in recent decades to a flourishing 
economic methodology literature. Methodologists of economic science 
have employed, for instance, criteria such as verification and 
falsification to assess the scientific status of various economic theories.1 
Others have taken a descriptive approach and used the Kuhnian notion 
                                                 
1 For a defense of the use of falsification to assess economic theories see Blaug 1992; 
for a critique of the criteria of scientificity see McCloskey 1985. 
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of “paradigm” and the Lakatosian framework of “scientific research 
program” to analyze and reveal norms of behavior, modes of theorizing, 
ways of formulating assumptions, and so on, which define, shape and 
characterize different schools of thought in economics.2 The recent 
interest in ontology, moreover, has raised questions concerning the very 
nature of economic reality, such as: ‘Are there any “real” economic 
forces or mechanisms at work beneath the surface of the appearances 
that empirical studies confine themselves to?’3 This whole literature, 
outlined in dotted lines, has played a major role in keeping the critical 
stance in economics alive. 
A recent development, which bears a close affinity to the main 
theme of this article, has further brought some other philosophical 
concerns and issues to the attention of historians and methodologists of 
economics. Drawing upon the theoretical and philosophical framework 
developed in poststructuralist theory, cultural studies, literary criticism, 
feminist theory, and so forth, economists such as Jack Amariglio, 
Antonio Callari, Stephen Cullenberg, Arjo Klamer, Deirdre McCloskey, 
David Ruccio have emphasized the role of literary and rhetorical 
practices in the production of scientific meanings in economics.4 
Consequently, the various linguistic devices economists use to produce 
and disseminate economic theories—the textual character of our 
knowledge of the economy—have become a locus of analysis. This 
literature has thus moved attention away from epistemological      
norms toward non-epistemological-discursive unities in the practice of 
economic science.  
This emphasis on the non-epistemological-discursive elements of 
economic theorizing opens up a new field for research in economic 
methodology. This article aims to make a contribution to this new field 
by bringing Michel Foucault and his theory of discourse (or discursive 
formation as he also calls it) into the picture. Foucault uses the term 
discourse in a particular way, although one cannot find an explicit 
definition of it in Foucault’s work. He rather lets the term develop in his 
concrete case-study-like analyses of the “rules and regularities” in 
different disciplines that confer to a given body of knowledge the status 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of scientific research programs in economics see, for example, De 
Marchi and Blaug 1991. 
3 Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of studies devoted to economic 
ontology. See Lawson 1997; 2003; and Mäki 2001. 
4 See McCloskey 1985; Amariglio 1988; Samuels 1990; Callari 1996; Cullenberg, et al. 
2001; Amariglio and Ruccio 2003; Klamer 2007. 
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of scientificity, i.e., the privileged position of being “the” scientific 
analysis of reality, in a historical time period. These rules and 
regularities constitute for Foucault a non-epistemological unity at the 
‘archaeological’ level of knowledge, in the sense of imposing historical 
limits upon what we can say, write, or think about any given object of 
scientific analysis in a particular historical era. It is the task of the 
archaeologist of knowledge to unearth these historical discursive rules 
and thus the whole matrix of relations within which they define and 
constitute the unity of a discursive formation. Furthermore, it is within 
this network of discursive rules, concerning the construction of objects 
of analysis, the formulation of concepts, the articulation of theoretical 
structures, and the like, that the conditions of the truth/falsehood 
dichotomy are determined (Foucault 1972). Claims to true and scientific 
knowledge of reality, therefore, which take on in epistemology a 
universal and non-historical character, appear in archaeology to have 
historical and contingent discursive elements.5 
Within this general framework the article sets itself two main 
objectives. First, it analyzes and compares—in the first section—the 
epistemological and archaeological approaches to the problem of 
knowledge in order to argue that Foucault’s archaeology offers a 
substantially different way to think about the problem, even if 
epistemology is defined as the theory of knowledge in the classical 
taxonomy of philosophy. While Foucault does not explicitly target 
epistemology, his archaeology involves, I maintain, a substantial implicit 
critique of the epistemological approach to the problem of knowledge. 
                                                 
5 Of three major themes in Foucault’s work throughout his career (archaeology in the 
1960s, genealogy in the 1970s, and technologies of the self in the 1980s), this article is 
confined to the first period where he develops his theory of discourse. This obviously 
does not mean that Foucault’s later studies do not bear upon economics. In fact, 
Amariglio, in one of the very few pieces on Foucault in the economics literature, offers 
a general introduction to Foucault for economists, drawing upon both his early and 
later studies (Amariglio 1988). A recent article by Steiner, moreover, uses Foucault’s 
lecture courses at the Collège de France during 1978 and 1979—roughly the period of 
transition from genealogy to the technologies of the self—to discuss Foucault’s 
analysis of the birth of political economy, the rise of 18th century liberalism and neo-
liberalism (Steiner 2008). However, whereas Amariglio’s essay is mainly centered 
around Foucault’s genealogical analysis of body and power, and Steiner refers to such 
concepts as governmentality and biopolitics that Foucault developed in his later 
studies in the 1970s and 1980s, this article approaches Foucault explicitly from the 
perspective of the theory of knowledge. As Foucault himself remarks (Foucault 1980), 
his early work on the archaeology of knowledge constitutes the basis for much that he 
did in his later studies. A close scrutiny of the implications of Foucault’s archaeology 
for economics should therefore add an important dimension to Foucault’s relevance 
for the study of economics. 
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The other objective is to present—in the second section—Foucault’s own 
archaeological reading of the history of economics and to scrutinize his 
contribution to a non-epistemological theoretical space for historical 
and methodological analysis. In the last section I conclude with some 
remarks concerning the Foucault-postmodernism-economics nexus.  
 
THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE: EPISTEMOLOGY VS. ARCHAEOLOGY 
The problem of knowledge, which can briefly be formulated as “How do 
we know what we know?”, arises, as all other inquiries concerning 
human understanding, when the human mind turns back upon itself 
and reflects on its own operations. The genesis of the problem, however, 
does not necessarily prescribe in itself the method for its inquiry. In 
other words, locating its origin in the reflexivity of the human mind on 
its own operations does not require that the problem of knowledge be 
analyzed within a framework that takes the human mind as one of its 
operative variables. This is the path taken by that subfield in philosophy 
known as epistemology, a path whose markers are set in accordance 
with a certain understanding of the problem of knowledge. The problem 
is posed there as a non-historical and universal correspondence relation 
between the epistemic subject, based on the Cartesian cogito, and 
objective reality, which exists out there independently of the ways of 
knowing it. Epistemology, therefore, is based on a fundamental 
ontological divide between the subject and the object of knowledge, 
where each exists independently of the other. The main problem for 
epistemology consists then in finding ways to close this ontological gap 
between the subject and the object so as to allow us to proclaim that we 
have acquired true knowledge of things. 
Beginning from the 17th and up until the early 20th century, i.e., 
until the time when the philosophy of language and logic appeared as 
the dominant paradigms in Western philosophy, the problem of 
knowledge was analyzed within two great traditions of epistemology: 
rationalism and empiricism. The Cartesian cogito, which Descartes set 
up in his A discourse on method (1934) and Meditations on first 
philosophy (1996), defined the fundamental problem with which not 
only rationalism but epistemology in general would grapple with for the 
centuries to come. Descartes’s main concern in his philosophical 
investigations was the ‘quest for certitude’; his method was to reject 
everything as false about which he could have the slightest doubt. 
Descartes finds this certitude in “the Self”, the entity existing behind all 
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doubt, because the act of doubting is self-referential and requires the 
existence of a thinker (Descartes 1934). In constructing his cogito, 
Descartes was not only giving an answer to the epistemological problem; 
he was also defining the very problem itself. The Cartesian cogito, in 
other words, laid down the terrain for epistemology within which both 
rationalism and empiricism, the latter even in its rejection of the 
rationalist solution, would seek their own solutions. 
In order to make this argument more concrete we can look at the 
empiricist tradition. In his Essay concerning human understanding 
Locke, just as Descartes, looks upon the problem of knowledge as 
constituted by an abstract epistemological subject: 
 
Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which 
his mind is applied to about whilst thinking being the ideas that are 
there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas [...]. 
Whence has it [the mind] all the materials of reason and knowledge? 
To this I answer, in one word, from experience (Locke 1956, 19, 
emphasis added).  
 
For Locke, knowledge can have no other source than experience. He 
rejects any account of knowledge which makes recourse to innate ideas 
or concepts that the human mind possesses of its own nature. But, in 
the midst of these differences, or rather negations, we encounter a 
fundamental similarity between rationalism and empiricism: the 
epistemological problem itself. What brings Descartes and Locke 
together is not that they both dealt with inquiries concerning human 
knowledge, but that they both conducted philosophical investigations 
within the same problematic issues, using as it were the same language, 
however much they may have differed in the answer they gave. Even 
Kant, with his synthesis as outlined in his Critique of pure reason, 
belongs to these problematic issues of classical epistemology. When he 
said “But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not 
follow that it arises out of experience” (Kant 1965, 41), he was 
attempting to put in their proper places the a priori and a posteriori 




The philosophical framework adhered to by rationalism and empiricism, 
that which constitutes their common locus, characterizes classical 
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epistemology in its understanding of the problem of knowledge. Once 
we emancipate our mode of thinking from this particular problematic 
issue—once we allow ourselves to see the problem of knowledge not as 
concerned with prescribing universal criteria to attain the true 
knowledge of things, but as revealing the regularities, rules, and 
practices which make scientificity itself possible in a particular 
discipline and at a particular time period—a different problematic set of 
issues reveals itself. At this archaeological level (Foucault 1972; 1988; 
1994a; 1994b), as opposed to the epistemological one, the problem is  
not to prescribe how scientific analysis can reach the truth, but to 
understand how a particular discourse acquires the status of 
scientificity, how it creates in itself, so to speak, the conditions of what 
counts as truth. In The order of things, Foucault writes: 
 
I tried to explore scientific discourse not from the point of view of 
the individuals who are speaking, nor from the point of view of the 
formal structures of what they are saying, but from the point of view 
of the rules that come into play in the very existence of such 
discourse: what conditions did Linnaeus (or Petty, or Arnauld) have 
to fulfill, not to make his discourse coherent and true in general, but 
to give it, at the time when it was written and accepted, value and 
practical application as scientific discourse [...]? (Foucault 1994b, xiv). 
 
Knowing things, therefore, cannot be pictured for Foucault as a 
neutral and innocent practice of the intellect, whose only concern is to 
get to the truth about reality. Scientific discourse is part of a broader 
social whole within which it finds, and if necessary creates, its own 
conditions of existence; that is, within which it is labeled as scientific. 
Hence the analysis at the archaeological level of knowledge of the rules 
and regularities which scientists of a particular historical period 
follow—perhaps unconsciously—when they define their objects, form 
their concepts, and build their theories to acquire the ‘scientific’ label: 
 
[In the classical period] unknown to themselves, the naturalists, 
economists, and grammarians employed the same rules to define the 
objects proper to their own study, to form their concepts, to build 
their theories. It is these rules of formation, which were never 
formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely 
differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to 
reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, 
somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological (Foucault 1994b, xi). 
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Thus, in Foucault’s archaeological analysis, the main problem 
concerns the interrogation of those elements which allow scientific 
discourses to create their objects and to formulate their theories, but 
which also constrain them in their scientific investigations.6 These 
“historical a priori” elements impose limits in the sense that they 
involve certain rules and regularities which confer to a body of 
knowledge the status of scientificity in a particular historical period. 
Moreover, in its historical development a discipline adheres to different 
rules of scientificity; the study of these transitions occupies a prominent 
place in Foucault’s research. Foucault conceives of these changes not as 
a continuous progress in the development of scientific truth in which we 
get ever closer to the true knowledge of things, but as breaks, ruptures, 
or transformations at the archaeological level.  
In the next section, I shall analyze Foucault’s archaeological reading 
of the history of economic thought and discuss how he links those 
transformations at the archaeological level of knowledge to different 
discursive constructions of the economy as the object of economic 
science. But before, I would like to spend some time on Foucault’s 
historical analysis of the construction of “madness” and “illness” as 
objects of medical and mental sciences, respectively. This will pave the 
way for the discussion on the construction of the economy in the 
history of economic discourse, because Foucault follows similar lines in 
his archaeological reading of the history of these different disciplines.  
In his Madness and civilization, to start with, Foucault traces the changes 
of the way the Western culture has understood “madness” and made it a 
discursive object of “scientific” investigation. From the perception of 
mad people as having peculiar relations with divinity and being part of 
daily life in the Renaissance, to that which put them to houses of 
confinement together with the criminal and the unemployed, with all the 
“idle” elements of the early capitalist society that constitute its other 
(Foucault 1988).  
                                                 
6 Foucault’s analysis of the historical a priori elements of scientific discourses bears a 
relation to Kant’s main analysis in his Critique of pure reason of the conditions of 
possibility of human knowledge. For Kant, the a priori elements of reason have a dual 
character. They allow human minds to achieve the knowledge of things, i.e., they 
render knowledge possible; but at the same time they set the limits to our knowledge of 
things in the sense that things can only be known within the dimensions of time and 
space, and through a priori concepts of understanding (causality, unity, plurality, and 
so forth). Kant, in other words, analyzes the conditions of possibility of knowledge in 
terms of their positivity and negativity: what makes knowledge possible imposes at the 
same time its limits upon what and how we can know. This epistemological problem 
takes on a historical and discursive, i.e., archaeological, character in Foucault. 
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The discursive conception of madness further changed, Foucault 
explains, in the 19th century when madness constituted itself as the 
object of modern psychiatry and the mad person was defined as 
someone who was sick, and who should therefore be separated from 
other idle elements and subjected to medical treatment in the asylum. 
To the modern mind, this constitution of madness as an illness is 
nothing but the recognition of an objective reality which will eventually 
mitigate the sufferings of the mad through appropriate treatment in the 
asylum (Gutting 1989). For Foucault, however, the dissolution of the 
confinement system and the beginning of the asylum life for the mad 
was based upon the imperative of social control and manipulation of 
those who did not conform to morals and economic practices of modern 
bourgeois society.  
In The birth of clinic, he explains, in a similar fashion, the 
transformations that occurred in the perception of illness at the turn of 
modernity. From having an ideal existence separate from the sick 
person’s body, illness in the 19th century acquired a locality in the 
human body, making the modern clinical discourse possible as a new 
discursive formation about illness. This transformation in “medical 
gaze”, which for Foucault was not an epistemological event, created the 
conditions of possibility for a new sensibility (the modern clinical 
discourse), and established a new relation between the patient and the 
doctor. In the 18th century it was believed that the sick should be 
treated at home, where the patient would be in “the natural environment 
of social life, the family” (Foucault 1994a, 39). This would allow the 
doctor to capture the nature of illness more easily; whereas in the 
hospital where different illnesses would intermingle with each other, the 
nature of the illness would change through this interaction, making 
treatment more difficult. All this changed, according to Foucault’s 
archaeological analysis, with the transformation in the “medical gaze”. 
Illness, as the object of modern medical science, was stripped of its 
ideal existence independent of the body and located in particular 
organs, tissues, and the like. This development gave rise to the 
establishment of modern clinical practice in which illness is treated at 
the hospital at its specific locality in the human body. 
In his archaeological analysis of psychiatric and medical discourse, 
Foucault shows that the knowledge relation which the human mind 
establishes with reality is mediated through historical and discursive 
elements. His purpose, it should be emphasized, is not to evaluate the 
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epistemological status of these disciplines; he does not, in other words, 
explicitly question whether what these disciplines say about their object 
of analysis is objective, true or scientific according to a universal 
benchmark of epistemology. He is rather concerned with understanding 
upon what historical and discursive a priori structures conditions of 
scientificity arise; i.e., within what network of discursive elements, 
however epistemologically authorized and justified, reality becomes the 
object of scientific analysis, concepts become part of a scientific 
nomenclature and theories become formulated and accepted as the 
scientific cast for the truth. It is within such set of problematic issues 
that the analysis of the discursive constitution of madness and illness 
acquires its significance. For, according to Foucault, the historical a 
priori structures of modern Western thought, while making modern 
psychiatry and medical science possible, allow only a particular 
conception of madness and illness as objects of “scientific” analysis. 
But where exactly does the Foucauldian project of archaeology stand 
in relation to epistemology, especially when one considers that Foucault 
is rather reluctant to counterpose the two? Foucault’s lack of lucidity in 
this regard makes it difficult to come up with a clear-cut answer; but at 
the same time, this ambiguity creates a space to further elaborate upon 
the problem through commentary and analysis. The tension between 
archaeology and epistemology can be best explored I suggest, along 
three different lines.  
First, as argued above, epistemology’s understanding of the problem 
of knowledge is predicated upon an ontological dichotomy between the 
subject and object of knowledge. Foucault, however, does not pose     
the problem of knowledge in reference to or from the perspective of    
an abstract epistemological subject. He is rather interested in 
understanding the discursive rules of scientificity that the practitioners 
of science unconsciously adhere to in different historical time periods. 
And, since these rules impose limits as to how the objects of scientific 
analysis are constituted, that is, discursively “constructed”, the 
existence of an ontological gap between the epistemological subject and 
objective reality is seriously called into question by Foucault.  
Second, whereas the disinterested search for the transcendental 
truth of the objective world is a constituent component of the 
epistemological framework, for Foucault there are only different “truth 
claims” which are historically situated and which find their justification 
and authorization (regarding the status of their scientificity) within the 
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network of discursive rules. The idea of scientific progress where we get 
closer and closer to the true knowledge of objective reality is displaced, 
therefore, by the discourse-specificity of our knowledge of things.  
Third, Foucault’s archaeology allows him to introduce the concept of 
power into the problem of knowledge, which does not and cannot arise 
within the main problematic issues of epistemology. For Foucault, in 
other words, the operation of power in society—for example the social 
control of those who do not conform to the practices and values of 
bourgeois society, as mentioned above—is an integral element of claims 
to knowledge and of the historical production of truth.  
Taken together this suggests that Foucault’s archaeology entails a 
major critique of the underpinnings of epistemology. True, Foucault 
never problematizes his archaeology in its relation to and tension with 
epistemology. However, his account of the history of such disciplines as 
psychiatry and medicine, and economics as I shall try to explicate in the 
next section, demonstrates that there is much in the problem of 
knowledge and the actual practices of science that the epistemological 
framework fails to capture.7  
 
FOUCAULT AND THE ECONOMIC DISCOURSE 
In his The order of things, Foucault for the first time takes up economics 
as an explicit object of his archaeological analysis to point to the 
discursive elements at work in the construction of the economy as an 
object of scientific analysis in the history of Western thought. There, 
Foucault defines three different historical periods (epistemes) at the 
archaeological level of Western knowledge, with two breaks between 
                                                 
7 In relation to this, I would like to add that Foucault’s archaeology also entails a 
critique of the prescriptive frameworks of the philosophy of science (the principles of 
verification, Popperian falsification, and so on) as they derive directly from the same 
understanding of the problem of knowledge as in epistemology. The relation between 
archaeology and the descriptive frameworks of the philosophy of science (Lakatosian 
research program and Kuhnian paradigm) is, however, more complicated. Piaget (1970) 
argues, for example, that there are essential similarities between Foucault’s 
archaeological analysis and Kuhn’s notion of paradigm. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to delve into this debate, but allow me to state very briefly that I see both 
important similarities, as well as differences between these two frameworks. Just like 
Kuhn, Foucault maintains that scientific practice includes elements that go beyond 
epistemologically-authorized norms of scientificity. However, it seems to me that 
Foucault is rather interested in understanding the assumptions and regularities at the 
“unconscious” of scientific practice than in the paradigm shifts that result from 
deliberate and conscious reaction to the accumulation of certain theoretical problems. 
This allows him, for example, to explicitly problematize how and with respect to what 
discursive rules reality is constructed as the object of scientific analysis, a problem 
that does not arise in the descriptive branch of the philosophy of science. 
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them: the first break in the 17th century between the Renaissance and 
the classical periods; the other at the beginning of the 19th century 
between the classical and modern periods.  
In the Renaissance episteme, Foucault argues, “resemblance played a 
constructivist role in the knowledge of Western culture” (Foucault 
1994b, 17). In Foucault’s terminology, resemblance had a ‘positivity’ in 
making the knowledge of things possible, meaning that it was the 
defining archaeological principle that constituted the possibility of 
human knowledge. Knowing things in the Renaissance episteme 
consisted therefore in deciphering the signs imprinted into things which 
indicated the system of resemblance between them. 
 
There exists a sympathy between aconite and our eyes. This 
unexpected affinity would remain in obscurity if there were not 
some signature on the plant [its seeds], some word, as it were, telling 
us that it is good for diseases of the eye. [...] [The seeds] are tiny 
dark globes set in white skinlike coverings whose appearance is 
much like that of eyelids covering an eye (Foucault 1994b, 27). 
 
The knowledge that aconite could be used to cure eye diseases was 
based upon the sympathy, as a form of affinity, between the plant and 
the eyes. This sympathy could be known because of another form of 
resemblance as its sign, whose explanatory power was justified      
within the discursive structure of the Renaissance episteme itself: the 
resemblance between eyes and the seeds of the plant. 
There were no boundaries to the play of signs and resemblances in 
making the world, or rather the order of things, intelligible to us in the 
Renaissance. Resemblance might be found, for instance, in the principle 
of mobility (in the explanation of why things move at all): “[resemblance] 
attracts what is heavy to the heaviness of the world” or it makes “the 
great yellow disk of the sunflower turn to follow the curving path of the 
sun” (Foucault 1994b, 23). As far as economic discourse is concerned, 
the value of money and its role as the medium of exchange was based 
upon the intrinsic preciousness of the metal used. Money had a price 
and could function as the measure of all other prices because the 
monetary substance was of itself precious; and in its brightness the 
metal carried the sign of its own preciousness and worth. In the 
economic discourse in the Renaissance, “[f]ine metal was, of itself, a 
mark of wealth; its buried brightness was sufficient indication that it 
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was at the same time a hidden presence and a visible signature of all the 
wealth of the world” (Foucault 1994b, 174).  
Foucault identifies a rupture, or discontinuity, in the archaeological 
structure of Western knowledge at some time during the 17th century, 
when resemblance as the organizing principle of knowledge gave way  
to the “representation” of identities and differences on a table of 
classification. Consequently, the order of things for the classical 
episteme meant a taxonomy where things had their proper places in 
accordance not with their inherent signs, but with a representation of 
their identities and differences. These identities and differences, i.e., the 
presence or absence of common elements, also allowed the arrangement 
of things in a progressive manner from the simplest to the complex. 
 
[T]he Classical episteme can be defined in its most general 
arrangement in terms of the articulated system of a mathesis, a 
taxinomia, and a genetic analysis. The sciences always carry within 
themselves the project [...] of an exhaustive ordering of the world; 
they are always directed, too, towards the discovery of simple 
elements and their progressive combination [...] (Foucault 1994b, 74, 
emphasis in the original). 
 
This ordering, however, need not be quantitative. Foucault disagrees 
with the traditional account of the classical period as engaged in the 
mathematization of nature. The classical episteme was rather based on a 
mathesis, a general order of things which involved both quantitative  
and qualitative elements. The fundamental principle was not 
mathematization, but an ordering of things on a non-historical table 
through the representation of their commonalities and dissimilarities.8 
Having defined the basic framework of the classical episteme, 
Foucault investigates three disciplines of human sciences in the classical 
period: general grammar, natural history, and analysis of wealth, the 
predecessors of philology, biology, and political economy, respectively. 
He argues that in their investigations these three disciplines adhered to 
the main rules and regularities of the classical episteme. Natural history, 
                                                 
8 The metaphor “table” that Foucault uses frequently in his discussion on the classical 
period allows him to emphasize his idea that knowing things in this period of Western 
thought meant representing them in their appropriate places within a static (non-
historical) scheme of order. As we shall discuss below, Foucault uses the same 
metaphor in his analysis of the realm of exchange in the classical period. In particular, 
he argues that the realm of exchange constitutes an order (in reference to the exchange 
of equivalences) where things are represented through the monetary substance in 
accordance to their identities and differences in economic value. 
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for instance, confined itself to the ordering of living beings into a 
classification scheme. It was their proper places in this classification 
according to the common elements they possessed which constituted 
knowledge of living beings. Thus, “if biology was unknown, there was a 
very simple reason for it: that life itself did not exist. All that existed 
was living beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge 
constituted by natural history” (Foucault 1994b, 127-128, emphasis in 
the original). 
Foucault’s archaeological analysis has important implications for a 
reading, or rather a re-reading, of mercantilist economic thought. In this 
period, “in the order of knowledge, production does not exist. [...] the 
ground and object of ‘economy’ in the classical age, is that of wealth” 
(Foucault 1994b, 166, emphasis in the original). The mercantilist 
literature analyzed wealth in its relation to money as the representation 
of wealth within the sphere of exchange, and this was, for Foucault, in 
line with the general characteristics of the classical episteme based on 
the representation of identities (equivalences) and differences. And 
since money was the universal representation of wealth in the realm of 
exchange—on this table of equivalences—it is not surprising to Foucault 
that mercantilists identified money with wealth:  
 
If it was possible to believe that mercantilism confused wealth and 
money, this is probably because money for the mercantilists had the 
power of representing all possible wealth, because it was the 
universal instrument for the analysis and representation of wealth 
[...]. All wealth is coinable; and it is by this means that it enters     
into circulation—in the same way that any natural being was 
characterizable, and could thereby find its place in a taxonomy [...] in 
a system of identities and differences (Foucault 1994b, 175, emphasis 
in the original). 
 
If the mercantilists did not analyze wealth within a conception of the 
economy based on the realm of production, this was not because they 
were not aware of this realm, nor was it because they thought 
production was not significant enough to merit a place in the analysis of 
wealth. The reason, to Foucault, was that they conducted their analysis 
with respect to a particular discursive construction of the economy that 
rested upon the realm of exchange, upon a non-historical table of 
equivalences, where wealth circulated in the form of money as the 
universal representation of wealth. Unlike in the Renaissance episteme, 
however, the representative power of money (its function as a sign) was 
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not linked to the intrinsic preciousness and value of gold and silver. The 
relation was reversed in the classical period: whereas in the Renaissance 
episteme gold and silver could represent wealth due to their intrinsic 
value, in the classical period they had value as monetary instruments 
due to their function in the realm of exchange to represent wealth. 
 
Modern economic discourse 
There was another break, Foucault claims, at the archaeological level of 
Western knowledge at the turn of the 19th century. “[T]he theory of 
representation disappears as the universal foundation of all possible 
orders; [...] a profound historicity penetrates into the heart of things [...] 
[and] imposes upon them the forms of order implied by the continuity 
of time” (Foucault 1994b, xxiii). In the modern period, knowing things 
was not directed towards their representation in a non-historical table 
of classification, but upon their existence in real historical time. This is 
how knowledge of things became linked in the modern episteme to our 
understanding of their historical laws of development. It was as a result 
of this archaeological transition that “the analysis of exchange and 
money [gave] way to the study of production, that of the organism 
[took] precedence over the search for taxonomic characteristics” 
(Foucault 1994b, xxiii). It was the same change, according to Foucault, 
that consequently allowed biology to introduce life and historicity into 
the understanding of living beings, to study both the development of 
organisms and the origin of species. 
In economics, the sphere of production eclipsed that of exchange, 
with all its accompanying elements of labor, capital, division of labor, 
accumulation, and the like. All economic categories and problems, that 
is to say, came to be defined and investigated in terms of their relation 
to the realm of production. Whereas in the classical period value was 
determined within the system of exchange—within a non-historical  
cycle of equivalences—where money functioned as the universal 
representation of wealth, in modern economics value was linked to the 
productive activity of the human being, i.e., to labor. The laboring 
activity, moreover, was dependent upon the means of production, 
division of labor, the amount of capital invested, and so on, which 
themselves were related to past labor and to its historical productive 
organization (Gutting 1989). In Foucault’s account, “[t]he mode of being 
of economics [was] no longer linked to a simultaneous space of 
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differences and identities, but to the time of successive productions” 
(Foucault 1994b, 256). 
The break Foucault locates between the classical and modern 
periods provides us with some new insights into classical political 
economy. In Adam Smith, labor occupies a prominent place, consistent 
with the ascendancy of the realm of production over the sphere of 
exchange in economic analysis. But Smith’s break from the classical 
episteme was not complete according to Foucault, for even though Smith 
established a link between labor and the value of things, this link was 
possible only if the quantity of labor necessary for the production of 
things was equal to the quantity of labor that they would command in 
the process of exchange (Foucault, 1994b)—the so-called labor-
embodied-vs.-labor-commanded problem in the history of economic 
thought. In other words, labor in Smith’s analysis still had a 
representative element as a constant measure of value; it represented 
wealth in the sphere of circulation; or rather, wealth circulated in the 
form of labor, which necessitated the equality of labor embodied to 
labor commanded. The classical discursive principle of representation 
was still decisive in Smith’s economics as for him “all merchandise 
represented a certain labor, and all labor could represent a certain 
quantity of merchandise” (Foucault 1994b, 253).  
It was Ricardo, Foucault claims, who initiated the decisive break 
from the classical episteme in economic discourse. Ricardo was not the 
first to give labor a prominent place in economic analysis, but he was 
the one who first “single[d] out in a radical fashion [...] the activity that 
is at the origin of the value of things” (Foucault 1994b, 253). For him, 
the quantity of labor still determined the value of things, but this was 
not because labor represents wealth, but because labor, as an activity, is 
the source of value (Foucault, 1994b).9 In Smith’s discussion of the 
division of labor, the market, i.e., the sphere of exchange, retains a 
central importance, as the division of labor depends on the extent of the 
market. Wealth, which circulates in the sphere of exchange in the form 
of labor, determines the division of labor and hence has its effect on the 
realm of production. In Ricardo, production proclaims its superiority, 
and labor as the value producing activity becomes the central element 
that makes economic discourse possible: 
 
                                                 
9 Could this be the reason why Marx called Ricardo “the economist of production par 
excellence”? 
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Whereas in Classical thought trade and exchange serve as an 
indispensable basis for the analysis of wealth (and this is still true of 
Smith’s analysis, in which the division of labor is governed by the 
criteria of barter), after Ricardo, the possibility of exchange is based 
upon labor; and henceforth the theory of production must always 
precede that of circulation (Foucault 1994b, 254). 
 
It has been a common criticism against Smith to suggest that he 
confused the amount of labor embodied in the production of a 
commodity and the amount that it can command in exchange, and 
Ricardo’s contrasting approach has doubtless been very influential in 
this particular reading. In a similar fashion, mercantilists have been 
accused of confusing money with wealth; the popularity of that critique 
being largely driven by Smith himself. No matter what the final 
judgment be on these controversies, Foucault’s interpretation provides a 
different avenue to approach them and to think about the discourse-
specificity of theoretical problems and their solutions in economics. 
Foucault’s argument that modern economics starts with Ricardo has 
further repercussions for the study of 19th century economics in the 
sense of a new interpretation of Marxian economic discourse. Karl Marx, 
though acknowledging his debt to the important figures in classical 
political economy, argues that there are elements in his own theoretical 
structure that constitute a decisive break from classical political 
economy. In his The poverty of philosophy, for example, he emphasizes 
that classical political economy takes the relations of capitalist 
production as given and therefore cannot explain the historicity of these 
relations: “The economists explain to us how production is carried on in 
the relation given, but what they do not explain is how these relations 
are produced, that is to say the historical movement which has created 
them” (Marx 1995, 114). And since “[t]he economic categories are only 
the theoretical expressions, the abstractions, of the social relations of 
production” (Marx 1995, 119), concepts of political economy are devoid 
of historicity. Unlike his own analysis, Marx therefore argues, political 
economy studies the historical economic relations of capitalism as if 
they were the natural and eternal conditions of human existence.10 
                                                 
10 Marx’s own analysis of capital, however, not as a mere thing used in the process of 
production but as a historical social relation that defines capitalism is for him a case in 
point that shows the fundamental difference between his analysis and that of classical 
political economy. Furthermore, according to Marx the distinctions he introduces 
between abstract and concrete labor on the one hand and between labor and labor 
power on the other—main theoretical elements that he uses to develop his theory of 
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For Foucault, however, Marxian economics operates within the same 
archaeological field as Ricardo’s. To make his point, Foucault draws our 
attention to three important consequences of the conception of labor in 
Ricardian discourse. The first, already mentioned, is the determination 
of value through a series of historical events where both past and 
current labor play their respective parts within the historical 
organization of production. The second concerns the notion of scarcity 
and the position of the human being in the face of scarcity. This 
position calls forth for Foucault a new conception of “man” as an 
economic agent in the modern period. Whereas in the classical period 
human beings entered into economic discourse only in terms of “their 
capacity to form representations of things they needed and desired” 
(Gutting 1989, 188), modern economic discourse constructs a human 
being which has to labor to satisfy its needs in its confrontation, or 
rather struggle, with scarcity: “Homo economicus is not the human being 
who represents his own needs to himself, and the objects capable of 
satisfying them; he is the human being who spends, wears out and 
wastes his life in evading the imminence of death” (Foucault 1994b, 257, 
emphasis in the original). 
The third consequence concerns the relation of this human finitude 
to history. The “modern” history of human kind is the history of 
increasing wants and diminishing resources; it is a history during the 
course of which human kind increasingly feels the limitations of its 
being, i.e., its finitude. And this history will lead for Ricardo to a 
stationary state where there is no prospect for further development. The 
finitude of the human being, however, has a positive aspect for Foucault 
in the Kantian sense that what limits our knowledge of things makes at 
the same time this knowledge possible. It is the discursive construction 
of the human being in its finitude, in its limitation by scarcity, Foucault 
emphasizes, that makes modern economic discourse possible. Human 
finitude creates, therefore, the conditions of possibility of modern 
economics: in its finitude the modern human being establishes itself as 
a unified, centered, and rational subject, thereby creating a space where 
modern economics becomes possible as a human science. 
What separates Marx from Ricardo in this regard is that whereas 
Ricardo the pessimist sees history unfolding toward a stationary state 
where the human being will face the unavoidable consequences of its 
                                                                                                                                               
surplus value and exploitation—clearly differentiate his own account from “bourgeois 
economics” (Marx 1990). 
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finitude, Marx envisions a future where the human being, as the laboring 
subject, develops an awareness—when faced with the imminence of its 
finitude—that is supposed to initiate a radical change in the economic 
and social organization of society. Whatever their future projections, 
however, Foucault argues that both Ricardo and Marx see history as the 
struggle of the laboring subject to survive under the conditions of 
fundamental scarcity. In Ricardo, scarcity, hence human finitude, 
presents itself in historical time as increasing quantities of labor 
become necessary to produce the same amount of output due to 
diminishing returns. In Marx, on the other hand, scarcity finds its 
existence historically within the capitalist relations of production as 
capital accumulates through the exploitation of labor, and as the 
number of those who get no more than subsistence-level wages 
increases (Foucault 1994b). But despite such differences the scarcity-
labor combination (together with the corresponding constitution of 
“modern” history) represents, for Foucault, a common locus in Ricardo 
and Marx at the archaeological level of knowledge: “At the deepest level 
of Western knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity” 
(Foucault 1994b, 261).11  
Foucault’s archaeological reading of the history of economic thought 
suggests that what counts as scientific knowledge of the economy is 
determined within a network of historical and discursive elements    
that elude the main problematic of epistemology. Foucault rejects, 
furthermore, the presupposition that the same conception of the 
economy exists in historically distinct theoretical structures, thereby 
dispensing with the established continuities in the history of economic 
thought. But besides its significance for the historian, Foucault’s 
archaeology also has implications for the theorist and the methodologist 
of economics today within the general setting of “postmodernism and 
                                                 
11 Even the marginalist school of the 19th century is not immune to Foucault’s 
restructuring of the history of modern economic discourse. For the difference between 
labor and utility theory of value, Foucault very briefly suggests, is only a surface 
phenomenon (Amariglio 1988); they both are predicated upon the constitution of a 
finite human being in its confrontation with scarcity as its fundamental condition of 
existence. Whereas the labor theory of value puts the laboring activity of the human 
being at the center of its theoretical framework, the utility theory of value chooses to 
structure its theoretical analysis in the subjective sphere around need and desire 
(Foucault 1994b). They differ, in other words, only in the choice of the bodily function 
of finite “man” around which they articulate their respective theoretical structure: the 
laboring vs. the desiring subject in its confrontation with scarcity. Both subjectivities, 
however, belong to the same discursive formation for Foucault: the same discursive 
construction of modern man can be found, therefore, in various theories within 
modern economic discourse. 
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economics”. The final section, therefore, will be devoted to a brief 
discussion of how Foucault’s work might be important, not only for the 
history, but also for contemporary economics. 
 
FOUCAULT, POSTMODERNISM, AND ECONOMICS 
Foucault’s relation to postmodernism is a complicated one, not least 
because Foucault himself never associated his work, method of analysis 
or way of thinking with postmodernism. Additionally, there is such a 
variety of usages of the notions of modernism and postmodernism that 
it seems virtually impossible to come up with an overarching definition 
of postmodernism today. Sometimes postmodernism is defined as the 
cultural form or expression of late capitalism, characterized by        
mass commodification, globalization of production, widespread use of 
information technologies, and so on (Jameson 1991). Others use the 
term in reference to a certain “style” of creativity and interpretation in 
architecture, art, literature, philosophy, and the like, that includes such 
stances as deconstruction and self-reflexivity, and that celebrates the 
instability of meaning, the presence of indeterminacy, the play of 
plurality and chaos and the impossibility of representation (Amariglio 
and Ruccio 2003). Still others look upon postmodernism as “a discursive 
formation that signifies a different relation to modernism that arose 
within and alongside modernism itself” (Ruccio 1991, 499, emphasis in 
the original). It is not my intention here to systematically analyze these 
or other definitions of postmodernism. But the third definition would 
seem to offer a congenial space in which to elaborate upon the theme of 
“Foucault, postmodernism, and economics”.  
Now, postmodernism in this sense entails a (critical) relation to and 
an attitude toward modernism that aims to uncover and call into 
question, in a deconstructivist sense, the hidden assumptions and 
underlying metaphysical underpinnings of modernism (Screpanti 2000). 
In this (postmodern) sensibility toward modernism, the main critique is 
leveled at the modernist assumption that the exercise of “human 
reason” in its pure, abstract, and non-historical form is able to achieve 
universal goals such as truth, freedom, democracy, emancipation, and 
development (Peet 1999). All these “metanarratives” (Lyotard 1984) of 
the modernist discourse are criticized in postmodernism, especially on 
two fronts.  
First, postmodernism rejects the modernist construction of the 
human being as an abstract, centered, and unified entity with an 
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inherent essence and rationality (theoretical humanism) and argues that 
our subjectivities are constituted within a play of systems of signs, 
discourse, desire, the unconscious, cultural norms, institutions, and so 
forth (Best and Kellner 1991). In thus ‘decentering’ the subject, 
postmodernism aims to show that the modernist quest to reach 
universal goals through the exercise of human reason, which neglects 
the various mechanisms through which individuals are regulated and 
subjectivized, is ill-founded.  
Second, postmodern thought tries to demolish the strict modernist 
separation between science and rhetoric by denying the existence of 
universal and objective criteria of truth (Ruccio 1991). It argues rather 
that there are only different interpretations of reality, based upon 
different social structures of thought, which may or may not count as 
the true account of reality in different “regimes of truth”. This critique 
implies that scientific rationality leads to a state of affairs where 
alternative interpretations of the world are cast aside and silenced in  
the name of universal norms of scientificity which are themselves 
historically, geographically, and culturally situated according to 
postmodernism thought. 
From this perspective, it seems clear that Foucault’s work has a 
significant affinity with postmodernism, even though one cannot easily 
extend this affinity to a close correspondence. Many have remarked for 
instance that Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge includes elements of 
structuralism, which aspires to arrive at the universal laws between the 
constituent elements of a social phenomenon conceptualized as a 
structure, and thereby becomes the target of the postmodern critique. 
With respect to two specific points, however, there seems to be a close 
relation between Foucault and postmodern thought. 
First, his analysis of Western rationality through an historical 
account of scientific discourses—in other words, his willingness to 
approach the problem of knowledge, not in reference to an abstract and 
centered epistemological subject, but from the perspective of the 
discursive rules and regularities that determine what can be thought 
and said within the confines of scientific rationality—fits with the 
postmodern critique of theoretical humanism. Scientific practice for 
Foucault entails a process of subjectification through the historical rules 
of a discursive formation, a process that cannot be explained by 
recourse to the autonomous subject of epistemology. The historical 
aspect of Foucault’s archaeology also deconstructs the modernist notion 
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of progress of knowledge, in line with the postmodern idea that there 
are only different interpretations of the world and that there is actually 
no basis for claiming one of them to be superior to others.  
The second aspect of Foucault’s relation to postmodernism lies in 
how his archaeology of knowledge provides us with a theoretical 
framework to make sense of the distinction (or tension) between 
modernism and postmodernism. This refers to his articulation of the 
modern episteme, its essential principles such as historicity, continuity 
and the birth of man, and to his anticipation of a new discursive 
formation that is characterized by the death of man as it is    
understood in modernism. For Foucault, in such “countersciences” as 
psychoanalysis and ethnology (and today perhaps we can also add 
cultural studies, feminist theory, postcolonial studies, postmodern 
Marxism, and the like), man loses its essential position as a unified and 
centered being (Foucault 1994b). These disciplines are paying ever more 
attention to the decentered subjectivities, i.e., the multiple rationalities 
and ‘I’ positions, which arise through the complex interactions of the 
unconscious, desire, taboos, culture, institutions, and so on (Ruccio 
1991). Even though this new discursive formation that Foucault 
describes may not completely define for many the general milieu called 
postmodernism, it surely illuminates one central aspect of the 
postmodern critique of modernism. 
Based on this, one can argue that Foucault’s archaeology also helps 
us put the recent debate about “modernism vs. postmodernism” in 
economics into some perspective (Cullenberg, et al. 2001; Amariglio and 
Ruccio 2003). This debate has many facets, ranging from ontological 
premises to the problem of scientificity in economics. According to 
Screpanti, for instance, the ontological aspect of modern economics is 
characterized by its adherence to theoretical humanism, to “a humanist 
ontology of the social being” (Screpanti 2000, 88). Amariglio and Ruccio 
(1994) see the main tension as revolving around such dichotomies        
as order/disorder, certainty/uncertainty and centering/decentering. 
McCloskey (1985) and Klamer (2007) call into question the claim of 
economics to scientificity by showing the rhetorical and conversational 
elements of modern economic theorizing. I do not have space here to 
delve into the intricacies of this debate; therefore, I shall confine the 
discussion in this concluding part to a few examples that show in what 
ways Foucault’s archaeological framework bears upon the issue of 
‘postmodernism in economics’. 
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The postmodern critique of theoretical humanism serves here as our 
entry point. If, as Foucault argues, modern economics is discursively 
predicated upon the construction of human finitude, upon the bodily 
wills, desires and functions of man as a unified, centered and rational 
subject, then a postmodern discourse in economics, characterized by 
the death of man à la Foucault, would go beyond this theoretical 
humanism to construct a human subjectivity that is fragmented, 
decentered, indeterminate, and unstable (Amariglio and Ruccio 2003). 
Resnick and Wolff (1987), for example, in their rethinking of the Marxian 
notion of class move toward a postmodern stance when they 
conceptualize class, not as a stable and unified entity, but rather as a 
process in which people are involved in various ways. An individual  
may therefore partake in different class positions, and hence embody 
different subjectivities, in the processes of production, appropriation, 
and distribution of surplus value. Salaried employees, for example, such 
as managers, state officials and supervisors, get a share from total 
surplus in many complex and overdetermined ways, Resnick and Wolff 
argue, in so far as they contribute to the conditions of existence of the 
capitalist system. Hence the existence of unified class positions and 
subjectivities (the laboring subject of classical Marxism) is rejected in 
their postmodern Marxian analysis of capitalist relations. 
To illustrate further, some recent feminist research, and feminist 
economics in particular, criticizes the idea that feminist movements 
should seek to construct a stable feminine identity in its struggle 
against gender-based inequalities in society. This approach argues that 
since subjectivities and identities cannot be stable, gender (whether 
biological or a cultural construction) cannot establish unified and 
unambiguous subject positions (Butler 1999). Instead of creating, 
therefore, a construct of the modern human being with a bi-polar 
gender identity, such feminists take a postmodern position when      
they find gender differences in certain “acts” that individuals perform 
through their body. In their understanding of gender as performative, 
postmodern feminists argue that disciplinary techniques in society force 
subjects to perform specific bodily acts and thus create the appearance, 
or rather the illusion, of an essential, centered, and unified gender 
(Butler 1999; Hewitson 2001). 
Amariglio and Ruccio (2003) in their analysis of the postmodern 
“moments” of modern economics argue that in the (modernist) 
economics texts of Knight, Shackle, and Keynes the notion of 
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uncertainty as irreducible to probabilistic calculations undermines the 
construct of the knowing economic subject as it appears in modern 
economic discourse. For Amariglio and Ruccio, the distinction Knight 
introduces between risk and uncertainty (where the former lends itself 
to a priori calculations, but the latter not); Shackle’s treatment of 
uncertainty as creating a space for creative and imaginative processes to 
enter into the decision making of the economic subject; and Keynes’s 
notions of animal spirits and spontaneous optimism in his theory of 
investment are all postmodern moments in the sense that they             
all demonstrate that the rationality of economic agents can be 
overdetermined by a multiplicity of “psychological drives, hidden 
motivations and desires” as well as “conscious or unconscious forms of 
decision making” (Amariglio and Ruccio 2003, 87-88). What needs 
emphasis here perhaps is that the postmodern moments that Amariglio 
and Ruccio point to reveal the possibility of an economic theorizing that 
does not make recourse to a centered and unified subjectivity with a 
singular rationality. This point is important because the decentering of 
the unified economic subject of modern economic theorizing has 
influenced various schools of thought in economics, even though one 
cannot always find explicit references to Foucault or postmodernism in 
these literatures. Screpanti (2000) calls our attention, for instance, to the 
role that uncertainty plays in the post-Keynesian literature as a 
postmodern element. Amariglio and Ruccio (2003) further emphasize 
that the notion of general equilibrium as a state of order created 
through the rational and orderly behavior of economic agents becomes 
problematic once we allow for decentered subjectivities in economic 
theorizing. According to Screpanti (2000), evolutionary ways of thinking 
in institutional economics that maintain that economic processes cannot 
be explained in reference to an equilibrium ontology bear further 
testimony to this. 
To conclude, I would like to emphasize that Foucault’s work still 
awaits a close consideration by economists, including historians and 
methodologists of economic thought. The possibilities and challenges 
that Foucault offers for reading the history of economics from an 
unorthodox perspective and for moving beyond modernist theorizing in 
economics deserve more serious attention than they have received so 
far. This paper is an invitation for economists to take Foucault more 
seriously; an invitation based upon my belief that the incorporation of 
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the Foucauldian framework into various conversations in economics 
(historical, theoretical or methodological) would fill an important gap. 
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